We consider the efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly with substitutable goods where firms invest in process R&D that generates input spillovers. Under Cournot competition firms always invest more in R&D than under Bertrand competition. More importantly, Cournot competition yields lower prices than Bertrand competition when the R&D production process is efficient, when spillovers are substantial, and when goods are not too differentiated. The range of cases for which total surplus under Cournot competition exceeds that under Bertrand competition is even larger as competition over quantities always yields the largest producers' surplus.
Introduction
Competition over price (Bertrand competition) is known to yield lower prices than competition over quantities (Cournot competition). This result was first established by Singh and Vives (1984) for a symmetric duopoly supplying demand substitutes (see also Cheng, 1985) . It is robust to various generalizations, including the extension to an oligopoly (Vives, 1985) , to differences in costs under Cournot and Bertrand competition (Qiu, 1997; Lopez and Naylor, 2004; Zanchettin, 2006) , to differences in product quality under the two types of competition (Linn and Saggi, 2002; Symeonidis, 2003) , and to differences in market structure associated with price and quantity competition (Cellini et al., 2004; Mukherjee, 2005) . 1 In this paper we qualify the celebrated result of Singh and Vives (1984) by showing that Cournot competition can yield lower prices than Bertrand competition in a duopoly with endogenous production costs that supplies demand substitutes. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to establish that lower prices can obtain under Cournot competition with an exogenous market structure.
It occurs when products are relatively homogenous, when technological spillovers are strong, and when the R&D production process is sufficiently efficient. Indeed, under these circumstances the incentives to conduct R&D are much larger under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition as in this case much more of the benefits of any cost reduction are given to consumers when competition is over price. As a result, post innovation costs are much lower under Cournot competition which translates into a lower equilibrium price. The range of cases for which total surplus under Cournot competition exceeds that under Bertrand competition is even larger because profits under Bertrand competition are always 1 For an oligopoly supplying demand complements with quality differences an exception exists. Häckner (2000) shows that in this case the switch from Cournot competition to Bertrand competition induces the high-quality firm to charge a lower price. The resulting upward pressure on the demand for the low-quality complement then allows for a price increase of this complement.
below those under Cournot competition.
A motivating example for our analysis is the semiconductor industry. In this industry firms compete à la Cournot and technological spillovers are strong (de Bondt and Veugelers, 1989). It is precisely in this industry that prices have fallen at an astonishing rate of 36% per year in the 1990s. This pricing pattern can be attributed almost exclusively to quality increases that are associated with product innovations (Aizcorbe, 2006) . Although the alternative pricing pattern under Bertrand competition is by definition not available, this example does suggest that low prices can also emerge under Cournot competition.
Our analysis is related to that of Qiu (1997) . The main difference is that we consider technological spillovers to occur during the R&D process while Qiu (1997), following d' Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) , assumes that final R&D results spill over. That is, we consider input spillovers rather than output spillovers.
There are three important reasons for doing so (see also Hinloopen, 2003) . First, empirical studies indicate that spillovers indeed occur during the R&D process (Kaiser, 2002) . This finding corresponds to the three channels that Geroski (1995) identifies through which a technological spillover can occur: (i) the exchange of ideas through publications, casual encounters and at seminars, (ii) the flow of knowledge when a knowledge worker changes employer, and (iii) the deduction of the line of reasoning of rivals by observing their behavior.
Second, Qiu (1997) assumes the R&D results of one firm to be additive (and possibly perfectly additive), to its rival's R&D results. There are at least three reasons to question this assumption. Note that the two firms operate in the same product market while initially using the same production technology. It is then most likely that there will be some overlap in their independently obtained research results that are aimed at reducing the costs of production. Also, the parts that do not overlap are expected not to be a perfect match to rivals' research 3 results. Finally, differences in corporate culture, research strategies, and internal organization hamper any firm's ability to appropriate fully rival's research results.
In sum, high levels of technological output spillovers are not likely to be observed (Gerschbach and Schmutzler (2003) take an extreme position here by assuming that all of any firm's R&D results are perfectly additive to any of its rivals' R&D results).
Third, Qiu (1997) assumes diminishing returns to scale in R&D. In combination with additive output spillovers this has a counter-intuitive implication. If one firm has spent more on R&D than its rival, it could be in the interest of the former to donate its next R&D investment dollar to its rival and to appropriate the R&D results through the technological spillover. If these spillovers are substantial this could be a more effective additional cost reduction than spending this last R&D dollar on own R&D (Amir, 2000) . 
The model
We consider a two-stage game. In the first stage firms invest in cost-reducing R&D.
In the second stage they compete either over price or quantity. Market demand in indirect form is given by:
i, j = 1, 2, i 6 = j, where p i and q i are the respective price and quantity of product i, and where θ captures the extent to which products are differentiated; in case θ = 1 products are homogeneous while θ = 0 corresponds to completely differentiated products (i.e. both firms have a local monopoly). These polar cases are further ignored, that is, θ ∈ (0, 1). Unless stated otherwise, i, j = 1, 2, i 6 = j holds throughout the rest of the paper. Market demand in direct form is then given by:
The industry consists of two firms each producing one version of the differentiated product. Ex ante marginal costs of production, c, are fixed. We assume that both firms are active, that is, c < a.
Input spillovers versus output spillovers
The fixed production costs can be reduced by investing in process-innovating R&D.
Note that if one firm conducts R&D, the rival firm can absorb part of this effort without having to pay for it. 3 This process runs through the technological spillover.
In modelling this externality we adhere to the criterion identified by Amir et al.
( 2008), which states that it should be more beneficial to a firm to invest in one research laboratory than to invest in several independent research laboratories that possibly benefit from mutual spillovers.
Qiu ( Qiu (1997) it is beneficial to spread any R&D investment over a number of different 3 It is understood that firms have to conduct at least some R&D themselves to share in rival's R&D activities (for an early recognition of this point see Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) . We abstain from modelling this absorptive capacity as it would make the analysis intractable (cfr. Kamien and Zang, 2000). 6 independent research labs rather than investing it in one laboratory. In case of two firms a counter-intuitive result then obtains. Rather then investing its next R&D euro itself, it could be in the interest of a firm to give this euro to its rival for him to invest in R&D, and to appropriate the result through the output spillover.
In case of input spillovers the reduction in marginal cost brought about by an R&D investment is determined by an R&D production function g. Diminishing returns to R&D are present if g'> 0, g"< 0, and g(0) = 0. If firm i invests in R&D, its effective R&D investments X i due to the input spillover are given by:
Investing x i thus yields a reduction in cost of g(X i ). The criterion of Amir et al.
(2008) then requires:
which holds for any g with diminishing returns. Following Amir (2000) we set:
whereby γ > 0 determines the efficiency of the R&D phase. A higher value of γ corresponds to a less efficient production of R&D results. Note that R&D production function (6) fullfills criterion (5). Firm i's profits then equal
with 
Second-stage Bertrand competition
Maximizing (7) over price yields equilibrium prices conditional on effective R&D efforts:
Inserting (8) into (7) and maximizing the resulting profits over R&D investments result in the following cost reduction:
and concomitant total output:
Singel-firm equilibrium profits then equal:
where e Q B = 2e q B . Consumers' surplus and total surplus are then respectively given by:
and 4 A hat refers to a conditional equilibrium outcome. 5 A tilde refers to an unconditional equilibrium expression; superscript B stands for secondstage Bertrand competition. 6 The concomitant second-order and stability conditions are dealt with below. 8 
Second-stage Cournot competition
Maximizing (7) over quantities gives us:
Maximizing firm profits over R&D investments after inserting (14) into (7) yields as cost reduction and concomitant output level:
and:
Singel-firm profits are given by:
with e Q C = 2e q C . Consumers' surplus and total welfare under second-stage Cournot competition then equal:
and
Regularity conditions
The R&D stage gives rise to eight regularity conditions. In addition to the two second-order conditions, post-innovation costs have to be positive and the equilibrium has to be stable. The second-order conditions under Bertrand and Cournot competition require, respectively:
7 Superscript C stands for second-stage Cournot competition.
and γ ≥ (2 − θβ)
Under Bertrand and Cournot competition positive post-innovation costs respectively imply:
Finally, the Routh-Hurwitz stability condition is that:
This condition depends on the strategic nature of the R&D process. Following Bulow et al. (1985) , label decision variable x a strategic substitute in case
Accordingly, in a symmetric equilibrium condition (20) boils down to:
for strategic substitutes. For strategic complements it reads as:
Under Bertrand competition these two stability conditions respectively translate into:
In case of Cournot competition the two stability conditions are:
Five of these regularity conditions are redundant as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 1
The parameter space is bounded by regularity conditions R4, R5 and
R7.
Proof. It is immediate that R4 dominates R3, that R5 dominates R6, and that R7 dominates R8. Also, R5 dominates R1 and R7 dominates R2.
Note that Qiu (1997) considers stability conditions only in case where R&D is a strategic complement. In his model the stability conditions for R&D as a strategic substitute under Cournot and Bertrand competition are respectively given by (using the notation in Qiu, 1997):
where θ ∈ [0, 1] is the output spillover, where v is the measure of the efficiency of the R&D process, and where γ ∈ [0, 1] indicates the extent of product differentiation.
The analysis of Qiu (1997) applies only to R&D that is a strategic complement as it is straightforward to show that conditions (23) and (24) are more restrictive than the stability conditions when R&D is a strategic complement. 
R&D investments
Comparing the effective R&D efforts of the different competition modes leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For any given θ ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ [0, 1], e y C > e y B under R4, R5
and R7.
Proof. e y C > e The actual difference in R&D activity that leads to the ranking in Proposition 1 is closely related to the efficiency of the R&D process. That is:
Lemma 2 Under R4, R5 and R7, the difference in R&D activity under Cournot and Bertrand competition is larger the more efficient is the R&D process.
Proof. Note that
12 Then observe that:
This last conditions is less restrictive than condition R7 if, and only if (2−θβ)
Considering the left-hand side (LHS) of this last inequality, the result then follows as min {θ,β} LHS = lim θ→0 LHS| β=1 = 0.
The larger is the reduction in production costs for any level of R&D investment, the more prominent is the strategic effect that affects any firms' incentive to conduct R&D. Hence, the more efficient is the R&D process, the larger is the difference in R&D investments under Cournot competition vis-à-vis Bertrand competition.
Profits
Under Cournot competition firms invest more in R&D than under Bertrand competition (Proposition 1). And larger R&D investments reduce profits, all else equal. The following proposition shows however that these higher R&D costs under Cournot competition are more than offset by the concomitant reduction in production cost:
Proposition 2 For any given θ ∈ (0, 1) and
where
This last condition is less restrictive than condition R7 if, and only if, markets. But before we analyze total surplus we first consider consumers' surplus.
Price
For comparing prices under Cournot and Bertrand competition we introduce the following assumption: ).
Proof. For A1 and R4 to hold jointly it must be that 1 < a/c < (2+θ)/(2−θβ), or 2(a−c) < θ(aβ+c). Indeed, a and c can always be chosen such that this inequality holds. For A1 and R5 to hold jointly it must be that 1
Note that f (θ) is continuous and strictly increasing in θ ∈ (0, 1), that lim θ→0 f(θ) = 1 3 , and that lim θ→1 f(θ) = 1. For A1 and R7 to hold jointly it must
. Note that g(θ) is continuous and strictly increasing in θ ∈ (0, 1), that lim θ→0 g(θ) = 1 3 , and that lim θ→1 g(θ) = (5 − √ 17)/2 ≈ 0.438. 
Welfare
As producers' surplus is always higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition (Proposition 2), the result in Proposition 3 carries over to total surplus: Proposition 4 For any given θ ∈ (0, 1) and
R5, R7, and A1.
For a less efficient R&D production process it is still possible that total surplus under Cournot competition exceeds total surplus under Bertrand competition. In that case consumers' surplus is lower when firms compete over quantities (Proposition 3). But this lower consumers' surplus is then more than compensated for by the higher producers' surplus under Cournot competition. To establish this result it is convenient to distinguish two cases: (i) no input spillovers, and (ii) positive input spillovers.
Proposition 5 For any given θ ∈ (0, 1) and
under R4, R5, R7, and ¬A1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Absent input spillovers the traditional welfare comparison emerges provided that the R&D production process is not too efficient. For positive input spillovers the difference in R&D investment incentives under Cournot and Bertrand competition becomes more pronounced. Indeed, a threshold value of the input spillover exists beyond which total surplus is larger if firms compete over quantity rather than over price:
Proposition 6 Suppose that β ∈ (0, 1], and that R4, R5, R7 and ¬A1 hold. Then,
Technological spillovers carry a positive externality that raises total surplus.
The combination of large R&D investments and strong technological spillovers contributes in particular to total surplus. Hence, as under Cournot competition R&D investments exceed those under Bertrand competition, total surplus can be larger under quantity competition when the input spillover is strong enough.
17
We have shown that in a duopoly with substitutable goods where firms invest in process R&D, price can be lower under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. This occurs when the R&D process is efficient, when spillovers are substantial, and when products are not too differentiated. Under these circumstances much more of the benefit of any cost reduction are given to consumers under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. As a result the postinnovation costs are much lower under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition leading to lower prices when firms compete over quantities.
The robustness of our result should be checked along several dimensions. An obvious scenario would be to consider cooperative R&D prior to the production stage. Allowing firms to cooperate in R&D is an important policy tool to enhance incentives towards investment in R&D. As this policy is driven foremost by the resulting internalization of the technological spillover, it needs to be examined whether it affects the conclusion that price can be lower under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. 
Proof of Proposition 6
This proofs is a general version of that in Section 6.1. Observe that:
where ∆ B = γ(1 + θ)(2 − θ)(4 − θ 2 ) − (2 − θ 2 − θβ), ∆ C = γ(2 + θ)(4 − θ 2 ) − (2 − θβ), and F (γ, β, θ) = £ γ(1 + β)(4 − θ 2 ) 2 (1 + θ)(3 − 2θ) − 2(2 − θ 2 − θβ)
